Combustible Dust Testing

Laboratory testing to quantify dust explosion and reactivity hazards

Safety Data Sheets

Develop critical safety data for inclusion in SDS documents

Gas and Vapor

Laboratory testing to quantify explosion hazards for vapor and gas mixtures

Classification of hazardous materials subject to shipping and storage regulations
Testing and consulting on the explosion risks associated with devices and processes which use or produce hydrogen
Safety Data Sheets

Develop critical safety data for inclusion in SDS documents

Thermal Stability

Safe storage or processing requires an understanding of the possible hazards associated with sensitivity to variations in temperature

Adiabatic Calorimetry
Data demonstrate the consequences of process upsets, such as failed equipment or improper procedures, and guide mitigation strategies including Emergency Relief System (ERS) design
Reaction Calorimetry
Data yield heat and gas removal requirements to control the desired process chemistry
Battery Safety

Testing to support safe design of batteries and electrical power backup facilities particularly to satisfy UL9540a ed.4

Safety Data Sheets

Develop critical safety data for inclusion in SDS documents

Cable Testing
Evaluate electrical cables to demonstrate reliability and identify defects or degradation
Equipment Qualification (EQ)
Testing and analysis to ensure that critical equipment will operate under adverse environmental conditions
Water Hammer
Analysis and testing to identify and prevent unwanted hydraulic pressure transients in process piping
Acoustic Vibration
Identify and eliminate potential sources of unwanted vibration in piping and structural systems
Gas & Air Intrusion
Analysis and testing to identify and prevent intrusion of gas or air in piping systems
ISO/IEC 17025:2017

Fauske & Associates fulfills the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2017 in the field of Testing

ISO 9001:2015
Fauske & Associates fulfills the requirements of ISO 9001:2015
Dust Hazards Analysis
Evaluate your process to identify combustible dust hazards and perform dust explosion testing
On-Site Risk Management
On-site safety studies can help identify explosibility and chemical reaction hazards so that appropriate testing, simulations, or calculations are identified to support safe scale up
DIERS Methodology
Design emergency pressure relief systems to mitigate the consequences of unwanted chemical reactivity and account for two-phase flow using the right tools and methods
Deflagrations (Dust/Vapor/Gas)

Properly size pressure relief vents to protect your processes from dust, vapor, and gas explosions

Effluent Handling

Pressure relief sizing is just the first step and it is critical to safely handle the effluent discharge from an overpressure event

FATE™ & Facility Modeling

FATE (Facility Flow, Aerosol, Thermal, and Explosion) is a flexible, fast-running code developed and maintained by Fauske and Associates under an ASME NQA-1 compliant QA program.

Mechanical, Piping, and Electrical
Engineering and testing to support safe plant operations and develop solutions to problems in heat transfer, fluid, flow, and electric power systems
Hydrogen Safety
Testing and consulting on the explosion risks associated with devices and processes which use or produce hydrogen
Thermal Hydraulics
Testing and analysis to ensure that critical equipment will operate under adverse environmental conditions
Nuclear Safety
Our Nuclear Services Group is recognized for comprehensive evaluations to help commercial nuclear power plants operate efficiently and stay compliant
Radioactive Waste
Safety analysis to underpin decomissioning process at facilities which have produced or used radioactive nuclear materials
Adiabatic Safety Calorimeters (ARSST and VSP2)

Low thermal inertial adiabatic calorimeters specially designed to provide directly scalable data that are critical to safe process design

Other Lab Equipment and Parts for the DSC/ARC/ARSST/VSP2 Calorimeters

Products and equipment for the process safety or process development laboratory


Software for emergency relief system design to ensure safe processing of reactive chemicals, including consideration of two-phase flow and runaway chemical reactions


Facility modeling software mechanistically tracks transport of heat, gasses, vapors, and aerosols for safety analysis of multi-room facilities


Our highly experienced team keeps you up-to-date on the latest process safety developments.

Process Safety Newsletter

Stay informed with our quarterly Process Safety Newsletters sharing topical articles and practical advice.


With over 40 years of industry expertise, we have a wealth of process safety knowledge to share.

Published January 31, 2017

Revisiting Chernobyl - 30 Years Later

By: AnnMarie Fauske, Customer Outreach & Digital Media Manager, Fauske & Associates, LLC

Chernobyl’s 30th anniversary was April 26, 2016. It has been called the world’s worst nuclear accident. According to the World Nuclear Association:

“The April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine was the product of a flawed Soviet reactor design coupled with serious mistakes made by the plant operators. It was a direct consequence of Cold War isolation and the resulting lack of any safety culture.

The accident destroyed the Chernobyl 4 reactor, killing 30 operators and firemen within three months and several further deaths later. Chernobyl Monument and Reactor April 2012 Photo by Matt Shalvatis Radiation Syndrome (ARS) was originally diagnosed in 237 people on-site and involved with the cleanup and it was later confirmed in 134 cases. Of these, 28 people died as a result of ARS within a few weeks of the accident. Nineteen more subsequently died between 1987 and 2004 but their deaths cannot necessarily be attributed to radiation exposure. The Chernobyl disaster was a unique event and the only accident in the history of commercial nuclear power where radiation-related fatalities occurred.”    

Chernobyl Monument and Reactor April 2012 Photo by Matt Shalvatis

Robert E. Henry, PhD, Emeritus Senior Vice President and Regent Consultant at Fauske & Associates, LLC was one of the U.S. Delegates selected to attend the international meeting at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Since the IAEA is part of the United Nations (UN), this was the location selected for the USSR experts to explain what caused the accident, as well as what actions were taken during the aftermath. This three day presentation was entitled “Accident at The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences” and the briefing revealed the design and operational flaws responsible for the accident. As with all accidents, it is essential to learn from the accident conditions and the long term stabilization of the core material even when the designs are greatly different from those in the U.S.

“The design for the RBMK (reaktor bolshoy moshchnosty kanalny, high-power channel reactor) nuclear power plants that were built in the Soviet Union differed considerably from the commercial nuclear power plants built in the rest of the world,” states Dr. Henry. “Because of the Cold War, we had only a sketchy idea of the RBMK designs and how they were operated prior to the event. In those days, if we traveled abroad, we were always asked if you had contact with anyone from the Iron Curtain countries.

To illustrate the substantial differences in the designs, for the light water reactors that are built, licensed and operated in the U.S. and elsewhere, water cools the reactor core and also moderates the nuclear reaction. Hence, the water is an essential component of the nuclear reaction and if water were to be removed from the core as the result of an accident condition, the nuclear reaction will be inherently shutdown. Conversely, for the RBMK design, water is used to cool the reactor core inside of almost 1700 pressure tubes, but the nuclear reaction is moderated by graphite blocks which surround the pressure tubes. Therefore, water is a poison to the nuclear reaction for this design and, if water is removed from the core by an accident condition, the nuclear reaction intensifies and the power generated in the core increases rapidly. An increase in the core power acts to reduce the water inventory in the core at a faster rate resulting in further increases in core power. This characteristic is known as a positive void coefficient for the nuclear fission reaction. As a consequence of this core design characteristic, the accident that occurred in Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor was the first ever runaway nuclear reaction in a power plant, with the core power increasing exponentially to about 500 times the maximum design value over an interval of approximately 20 seconds."

This accident resulted from a desire to use the energy of a coasting-down turbine to power water injection into the reactor core if an accident condition were to result in a loss of electrical power to the plant. To investigate the real plant response, USSR scientists and engineers decided to test this concept on one of their plants. The intent was to initiate a loss of power transient for a reactor that was about to be shut down for refueling. As the reactor was in the process of being shut down and prepared for the test, the Kiev power dispatcher requested more power from the site and the reactor power had to be increased for a period of time."

Continues Dr. Henry, "A return to power from the plant state was complicated and the manner in which it was accomplished led to the violation of procedures that were in-place for safe operation of the plant. Another complicating feature leading up to the accident was that the test to be conducted was on the plant electrical equipment, so an electrical engineer was in charge, in the control room, for the test to be conducted that night. He had no understanding of the reactor core configuration caused by the return to power, the influence of a 'positive void coefficient', etc.

Another difference between the RBMK design and those used in the United States and elsewhere is the protection of a high pressure leak-tight containment building that surrounds the nuclear core and the reactor cooling system. A high pressure leak-tight containment is an important aspect of the plant design and licensing evaluations in the western world, but this was not part of the design for the Chernobyl plants. Therefore, the runaway power escalation rapidly over-pressurized the reactor coolant system such that it burst open, discharging the nuclear fuel and radioactive fission products into the surrounding environment. The gaseous and aerosolized fission products were ejected high into the air above the plant and these circulated to the north over the next two and a half days until an engineer walked in from the parking lot and into the Forsmark plant on a rainy Monday morning in Sweden. On entering the plant, he set off the plant radiation alarms because his shoes picked up radioactive iodine and cesium fission products that had been captured by the rain as they passed overhead. This was the first that the western world knew of the nuclear accident in the USSR and at the Chernobyl site specifically. When the satellite cameras were reviewed early on Saturday morning of April 26th, 1986, the flash from the bursting of the reactor coolant system and the discharged of fuel bundles out of the plant building could be seen from space.

Radioactive fission products from the Chernobyl were detected in the air in the Iron Curtain countries and Italy, France, Germany, Sweden and others. In fact, the radiation level in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania due to the Chernobyl accident was three times higher than peak observed from the TMI-2 accident in 1979. Fear of the unknown is a powerful emotion and it caused milk and food to be confiscated in some counties and also resulted in the shutdown of the one nuclear plant that was operating in Italy at the time as well as the stoppage of construction of one that was being built."

Following the TMI-2 and Chernobyl accidents, Fauske and Associates, LLC assisted a number of U.S. utilities, including Commonwealth Edison in the evaluations of individual commercial nuclear plants with respect to their defensive-in-depth capabilities for a large range of accident scenarios. The results of these studies were entitled Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) and they were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for their review. Most of these were eventually expanded into full Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs). In addition, in the early 90’s, FAI was selected by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to formulate the Technical Basis Report that characterized the status of the important phenomena that could occur during a core damage event in a sufficient manner to formulate Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) for both Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) designs and all types of high pressure leak-tight containments. As part of this, a new version of the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) code (MAAP4 and later, MAAP5) was chartered to support the evaluations of SAMGs for different designs for a large spectrum of accident conditions. All of these have added to increase the defense-in-depth for protection against accident conditions that could result in overheating of reactor cores.

We welcome discussion or questions concerning modern day plant safety.  For more information, please visit or call 630-323-8750, 1-888-FAUSKE1 or contact AnnMarie Fauske at, 630-887-5213. 

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